If your organization is working through DORA compliance and already uses Atlassian products, you've probably asked a very practical question: does the way your compliance team already works fit into Jira, or fight against it? Are Atlassian tools doing real work here, or just adding another place to type things twice?
This article answers that in three steps. First, we check whether Atlassian's platform is trustworthy enough to build a regulated workflow on at all. Second, we show how Jira and Confluence cover DORA's risk management and audit needs, and exactly where a new compliance manager would click to set that up. Third, we walk through DORA's ICT incident reporting requirements and show which additional tools carry the process the rest of the way.
Important note: We are not lawyers, and nothing here is legal advice. The tool recommendations are based on our expertise with Jira and on the experience of real SaaSJet clients. The regulation defines what needs to be done; the choice of tool remains yours.
DORA (the Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) has applied to EU financial entities since 17 January 2025 — banks, insurers, payment and e-money institutions, investment firms, crypto-asset service providers, and the critical ICT providers that serve them. Its goal is simple: make sure the financial sector can keep running, or recover quickly, when something goes wrong with its technology.
ICT stands for "Information and Communication Technology." ICT risk is any risk related to a company's IT systems. It covers:
Not in the EU? This still applies to you in spirit. Similar rules exist elsewhere under different names — the UK's FCA/PRA Operational Resilience regime, Australia's APRA CPS 230, and others. Deadlines, article numbers, and legal terms vary, but the approach is the same: manage your risks, report incidents on time, test your resilience, and be able to show that you did. The Jira setup below follows that approach. If your local rules require a 6-hour deadline instead of DORA's 4-hour one, you adjust the numbers and field options — not the workflow.
Before asking whether Atlassian products help with DORA specifically, you need proof that Atlassian is a place a regulated business can safely build any compliance process at all. What matters is whether the records are trustworthy, whether someone independent has checked the controls, and whether there's a real paper trail. Atlassian's own security documentation gives a concrete answer to all three.
Where this sits relative to DORA: Atlassian's Trust Center frames its role as shared responsibility — it secures and documents its own platform, but each financial entity remains accountable for its own compliance posture on top of it.
DORA's first pillar asks for two different things, and each calls for a different tool.
1. A documented governance framework (policies, risk tolerance, budget). This can live as a Confluence page or a small space of linked pages. Confluence keeps a version history of every edit automatically — who changed what and when, with no configuration.
One limit is worth being precise about, because an auditor will be: version history evidences editing, not approval. Under Article 5(2) of DORA, approval of the ICT risk management framework and the resilience strategy sits with the management body. Showing that a named person approved a policy has to be a deliberate step — an approval task linked to the page, an inline sign-off, or a comment naming the approver and the date. Version history will preserve it, but will not produce it on its own.
2. An operational cycle of identifying, classifying, and responding to risk. This is what Jira is built for, and it's where the rest of this section stays. To manage the operational process and reporting, we created a dedicated space tracking two types of work: Risk and Reporting.
This workflow shows the life of one risk, from the moment your team finds it to the moment it's closed. Every financial entity handles risk a little differently, but DORA expects the same basic steps: find the risk, decide what to do about it, and record that decision.
NEW → IN CLARIFICATION → AVOID / MITIGATE / TRANSFER / ACCEPT → RESOLVED → ARCHIVED
Without custom fields, a status like ACCEPT or MITIGATE shows what the team decided — not why, and not how big the risk is. For DORA compliance, you need to show how risk was measured, how it changed, and which decisions management approved. Custom fields also make automation possible: they let Jira create a Reporting Task automatically when a risk is classified as Major.
| Field | Type | What It Means |
|---|---|---|
| Current Likelihood | Select (1–5) | Shows the risk's path: where it started, where it is now, and where it should end up per the approved risk tolerance level. |
| Target Likelihood | Select (1–5) | The Likelihood level management has approved as acceptable — the practical expression of the entity's documented ICT risk tolerance level. Required under Article 6(8)(b) as part of the digital operational resilience strategy; management approval required under Article 5(2)(d). |
| Current Impact | Select (1–5) | The current estimate of impact, updated at every reassessment (through Form 3 — Root Cause / Closure). |
| Target Impact | Select (1–5) | The Impact level management has approved as acceptable. Usually set once, at IN CLARIFICATION. |
| Current Risk Class | Select (1–5) | Calculated: Current Likelihood × Current Impact. Shows where the risk sits now on the Low / Medium / High / Critical scale. |
| Target Risk Class | Select (1–5) | Calculated: Target Likelihood × Target Impact. The goal — whether the risk has reached an acceptable level. |
| DORA Classification | Select | Pending / Major / Not Major. Shows whether an incident meets DORA's major threshold under Article 18. One wording note: in DORA, incidents are major and cyber threats are significant — not the same thing. The classification criteria and thresholds come from a related technical standard, RTS 2024/1772 (criteria in Articles 1–7, thresholds in Article 9). Setting this to Major makes Jira create a linked Reporting Task. |
| Root Cause Confirmed | Select / Checkbox | Yes / No. Marks the moment root cause analysis is complete — different from the RESOLVED status. Under Article 19(4)(c), the final report is submitted once root cause analysis is finished, even if the fix isn't fully in place. That's why it's a separate field instead of waiting for RESOLVED. Setting it to Yes moves the linked Reporting Task to FINAL REPORT DUE. |
This workflow exists to help a financial entity meet its ICT incident reporting obligations to the competent authority, on time, every time. Its statuses match the three submissions required by Article 19(4), plus a starting and a closing status.
NEW — A Reporting Task is created automatically as soon as the linked Risk Task is classified as Major. This status mostly exists because every Jira workflow needs a starting status mapped to the "To Do" category.
INITIAL NOTIFICATION — The actual submission of the initial notification to the competent authority. Under Article 5 of RTS 2025/301, it must go out as early as possible — in any case within 4 hours of the incident being classified as major, and no later than 24 hours from the moment the entity became aware of the incident. Whichever limit comes first applies.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT DUE — The second submission, due within 72 hours after the initial notification is sent (RTS 2025/301, Article 5). The clock starts when the notification is sent, not when the incident was classified. It gives an updated view: what changed, and any new information found. You submit it even if nothing has changed. This status can repeat — DORA requires an updated intermediate report without undue delay, and always once regular activities are restored.
FINAL REPORT DUE — Entered when Root Cause is confirmed. Under Article 19(4)(c), the final report is submitted once root cause analysis is complete, even if remediation is ongoing — so the task can reach this status while the technical team is still fixing the problem. Under Article 5 of RTS 2025/301, the final report is due no later than one month after the intermediate report, or after the latest updated intermediate report.
DONE — All three required submissions have been sent. The reporting obligation for this incident is complete.
From here, everything runs on Jira's built-in features. If you're new to Jira, the steps below show exactly where to click.
Risk Task — tracks an ICT risk from identification to resolution: classification, likelihood and impact scoring, treatment decision (avoid, mitigate, transfer, accept), and root cause confirmation. This is where DORA's operational risk-management cycle lives.
Reporting Task — tracks the regulatory obligations tied to a Major ICT incident: the three deliverables required by Article 19(4), each with its statutory deadline. Auto-created when a linked Risk Task is classified as Major. Closing it means the paperwork is done, not that the incident is resolved.
Scheme of Risk Workflow:
Scheme of DORA Reporting Workflow
Then go to Space settings, map your workflow with work types, and publish changes.
Automation is what connects a Risk Task to a Reporting Task without anyone doing it manually. When a risk is classified as Major, Jira creates the reporting work item by itself.
Reporting: {{issue.summary}}Everything in this section runs on native Jira: two custom work item types, two custom workflows, a set of custom fields carrying the DORA-specific data, and one automation rule connecting them. A Risk Task moves through identification, scoring, and treatment on its own. The moment DORA Classification is set to Major, the automation creates a linked Reporting Task and transitions it into INITIAL NOTIFICATION. From there, the Reporting Task's workflow carries the three DORA submissions.
A DORA incident evolves. What's known at detection is very different from what's known at classification, investigation, or closure. Rather than cramming all of it into one Jira screen, Smart Forms for Jira can act as structured checkpoints attached to the same work item across the incident lifecycle, each collecting exactly what's available at that stage.
A typical flow:
Incident detected → Incident Intake Form → DORA Classification Form → investigation and reporting → Root Cause / Closure Form
Each form has a different purpose, but all of them update the same Jira work item: the Intake Form can create it, the Classification Form records the classification decision, the Closure Form marks it ready to close. Selected form answers map to Jira fields, so the work item keeps driving dashboards, filters, assignments, and the automation rule above.
At the start, the priority isn't a complete regulatory record — it's capturing enough reliable information to open the incident and give the response team a structured starting point. This form is deliberately short: it's often the first point of contact with someone outside the compliance team, sometimes outside Jira entirely, at the moment they're least equipped to answer detailed questions. Every extra required field trades completeness for speed.
| Field | Options / Formula | DORA Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Summary | — | Clear summary of what happened |
| Description | — | Free-text detail not covered by the fields below; not tied to a specific DORA requirement |
| Initial Likelihood | 1 to 5 | — |
| Initial Impact | 1 to 5 | — |
| Initial Risk Score | {Initial Likelihood}*{Initial Impact} |
— |
| Date/Time of Detection | — | Feeds the duration criterion (RTS 2024/1772, Article 3) — if the moment downtime began can't be established, it's measured from detection. Also the start of the 24-hour outer deadline for the initial notification, which runs from the moment the entity became aware, not from classification |
| Incident Type | Cyber attack / System failure / Third-party failure / Other | — |
On submission, this form can create the Risk Task.
Article 18 sets the classification framework for ICT-related incidents, and RTS 2024/1772 makes it measurable: seven criteria, in Articles 1 to 7, with materiality thresholds in Article 9. Once more is known, a Classification Smart Form can guide the responsible team through these criteria in sequence instead of putting every question on the Jira screen. Conditional logic keeps it manageable — a question about financial counterparties only appears if the affected service involves them — and the form calculates derived values, like the percentage of clients affected, instead of asking someone to do it by hand.
| Field | Options / Formula | DORA Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Clients Using the Affected Service | — | A reference figure for the relative threshold below; DORA doesn't require this field itself. Important: the denominator is clients of the affected service, not the entity's whole client base. For a multi-product entity, these are fundamentally different numbers |
| Clients Affected | — | The "clients, financial counterparts and transactions" criterion (Article 1, RTS 2024/1772) — direct and indirect clients |
| % of Clients Affected | {Clients Affected}/{Clients Using the Affected Service}*100 |
Article 9(1), RTS 2024/1772: threshold met if more than 10% of clients using the affected service are affected, or more than 100,000 clients in absolute terms. The same criterion has two further dimensions worth tracking separately: more than 30% of financial counterparts depending on the affected service, and more than 10% of average daily transaction count or value |
| Can affected count be determined? | Yes / No | If the exact number can't be determined, a reasonable estimate is used and that fact is recorded in the Classification Rationale. This is not an automatic basis for a major classification — the rule that thresholds count as met when information is lacking applies to significant cyber threats, not to incident classification. Don't conflate the two |
| Reputational Impact | None / Media coverage / Client complaints / Counterparty or regulator enquiry / Loss of clients or counterparts | The "reputational impact" criterion (Article 2; threshold Article 9(2)). This is the seventh criterion and the one most easily missed — no single numeric threshold, assessed by indicators. If a form claims to cover the RTS criteria, this one needs to be in it |
| Duration (hours) | — | The "duration and service downtime" criterion (Article 3; threshold Article 9(3)): incident duration over 24 hours, or downtime over 2 hours for ICT services supporting critical or important functions. Two different numbers — keep them in separate fields. If the moment downtime began can't be determined, it's measured from detection |
| Geographic Spread | Member States | The "geographical spread" criterion (Article 4; threshold Article 9(4): impact in two or more Member States). A multi-select fits because the threshold is counted by their number |
| Data Loss Type | None / Availability / Authenticity / Integrity / Confidentiality | The "data losses" criterion (Article 5; threshold Article 9(5)). DORA consistently lists four data properties — availability, authenticity, integrity, confidentiality — so Authenticity has to be an option. The threshold is also met in case of data loss through unauthorized access to systems |
| Criticality of Services | Critical / Important / Neither | The "criticality of the affected services" criterion (Article 6). Under Article 8 this is a gateway condition, not one criterion among equals — the incident is weighed against the other thresholds only once a critical or important function is affected. This field belongs first in the form, not tenth |
| Financial Loss Estimate | — | The "economic impact" criterion (Article 7; threshold Article 9(6): costs and losses have exceeded, or are likely to exceed, EUR 100,000). It's the sum of all cost types, so link it to the three cost fields in the Closure form |
| Estimated / Confirmed | Estimated / Confirmed | Our own addition — the initial notification may contain estimates, the final report requires confirmed figures |
| DORA Classification | Pending / Major / Not Major | The decision under Article 18 (against the thresholds in Articles 8–9, RTS 2024/1772), which triggers the obligations in Article 19 |
| Classification Rationale | — | Entities must apply the criteria consistently and document why. Because the Article 8 logic — gateway plus at least two thresholds — is a judgement, not arithmetic, this written rationale is the actual evidence behind the decision |
| Classification Authority (Approver) | — | Article 17(3)(c) requires assigning roles and responsibilities activated for different types of ICT-related incidents |
The Smart Form attaches to the Risk Task as a checklist and can update the DORA Classification field on the linked work item directly. That field is what the automation watches: DORA Classification = Major triggers the Reporting Task. The completed form stays attached as the rationale behind that decision; not every answer needs to become a separate Jira field, only the ones the rest of the workflow acts on.
During investigation, additional Smart Forms can attach to the same work item instead of living as disconnected documents. A form can double as a structured checklist for the people working the case, while only the operationally important values — status, owner, confirmed impact — map to Jira fields. That keeps the work item from turning into dozens of custom fields, while the full incident record stays connected to the work.
As the incident moves toward resolution, root cause is confirmed, costs are known, and remediation has an owner. This is also the point to look back and compare what was assumed at intake against what was confirmed: Initial Risk Score against Current Risk Score, Estimated against Confirmed Financial Loss. That comparison is itself useful evidence for the lessons-learned section of the final report.
| Field | Options | DORA Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Root Cause Confirmed | Yes / No | Article 19(4)(c) — this event, not RESOLVED, is the content condition for the final report. The deadline itself still runs from submission of the intermediate report (one month, Article 5, RTS 2025/301), not from this checkbox |
| Root Cause Description | Full description of the cause | Content for the final report — the root cause analysis Article 19(4)(c) requires to be complete before final submission |
| Contributing Factors | — | Supports completeness of the root cause analysis. The exact section structure comes from the templates in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/302 — check against the current template before publishing |
| Client Notification Required | Yes / No | Article 19(3) — a separate obligation to notify, without undue delay, clients whose financial interests are affected, and the measures taken. Not part of the reporting cascade to the regulator (that's paragraph 4) — it runs in parallel |
| Direct Cost | — | The "economic impact" criterion (Article 7, threshold Article 9(6), RTS 2024/1772) + the cost section of the final report |
| Recovery Cost | — | Same — recovery costs are part of the economic impact criterion, calculated as the sum of all cost and loss types |
| Regulatory Cost | — | Same — fines and regulatory costs as part of the full economic impact picture |
| Current Impact / Current Likelihood | Reassessed at closure | Not from the DORA text — our own risk-management practice of tracking the trajectory, not a regulatory requirement |
| Current Risk Score | {Current Likelihood}*{Current Impact} |
Same — a derived value for internal risk management |
| Lessons Learned | — | A section of the final report + supports Article 17(2) DORA and Article 22(d), RTS 2024/1774 — mechanisms to analyse significant or recurring incidents and patterns in how often they occur |
| Remediation Owner | — | Article 17(3)(c) — the entity must assign roles and responsibility for handling different types of incidents |
Submitting the Smart Forms can move the work item to its next status, and restrictions can limit who is allowed to complete or edit it — useful when only a named Classification Authority should be able to confirm the DORA Classification decision.
Classifying an incident as Major and building the Reporting Task workflow only gets a financial entity halfway. DORA's ICT incident reporting obligations come with hard deadlines to the competent authority. This is where SLA Time and Report for Jira takes over. For each deadline you configure an SLA with start and stop conditions matching the actual events in your workflow, so the countdown reflects the real regulatory clock rather than generic ticket age.
| SLA Goal | Limit | Start | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Notification — limit from classification | 4 hours | DORA Classification = Major (the moment the Reporting Task is created) |
The submission is required by Article 19(4)(a) DORA. The 4-hour limit runs from the moment the incident is classified as major — Article 5, RTS 2025/301 |
| Initial Notification — outer limit | 24 hours | Date/Time of Detection | Article 5, RTS 2025/301: no later than 24 hours from the moment the entity became aware of the incident |
| Intermediate Report | 72 hours | Status changes INITIAL NOTIFICATION → INTERMEDIATE REPORT DUE |
Article 19(4)(b) + Article 5, RTS 2025/301 — the clock runs from submission of the notification, not from classification. Due even if nothing has changed; an updated intermediate report must be sent without undue delay, and in any case once regular activities are restored |
| Final Report | 1 month | Status changes INTERMEDIATE REPORT DUE → FINAL REPORT DUE |
Article 5, RTS 2025/301. Article 19(4)(c) separately requires root cause analysis to be complete at submission — a content condition, not the start of the clock. Setting Root Cause Confirmed to Yes moves the task into this status, but does not by itself start this SLA |
You can also turn on breach alerts. Pre-breach warnings arrive as a comment directly on the ticket, so the assignee and reporter see the countdown tightening before the deadline hits. Once a deadline is actually breached, that notification can also be routed to a Slack channel — so the compliance manager and the wider team find out the moment a limit is missed, not just the person watching the ticket.
One calendar detail: Under Article 5(4) of RTS 2025/301, where a submission deadline falls on a weekend or a public holiday in the entity's Member State, the report may be submitted by noon of the next working day. But Article 5(5) withdraws that allowance — for the initial notification and the intermediate report — from credit institutions, central counterparties, operators of trading venues, and entities identified as essential or important under Article 3 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555. In plain terms: if you're a bank, the clock on the first two submissions does not pause for the weekend. Good reason not to apply a single working calendar to all four goals above.
Everything above covers the deadlines DORA sets for reporting a Major incident. But nothing stops a compliance or risk team from setting internal SLAs for how long a Risk Task should sit in a given stage, whether or not the incident ever becomes reportable.
For example: a risk shouldn't stay in IN CLARIFICATION for more than 5 hours before a treatment decision, or MITIGATE work should show progress within a set number of days. DORA doesn't set a time limit on risk treatment, but Article 17(2) does expect procedures for monitoring, handling, and following up on ICT risk consistently — and an SLA that flags a risk quietly sitting untouched for weeks is one practical way to show that follow-up is actually happening, not just documented as a policy.
Configuring SLA rules answers the forward-looking question: will we make it. A month later, an examiner asks a different one: did you, every time, and how do you know. SLA Time and Report answers that too, which is why the deadline evidence lives here rather than in change-log tooling.
| DORA requirement | What it asks for in practice | The feature that produces it |
|---|---|---|
| Article 5, RTS 2025/301 — three reporting deadlines, each with its own start event | A per-incident record of whether each configured reporting SLA was met or exceeded, including SLAs starting from different events | The SLA Grid: every SLA goal for every incident in a structured table, selectable by space, SLA configuration, saved filter, JQL, sprint, label, or reporter, with columns you choose on export |
| Article 22, RTS 2024/1774 — mechanisms to analyse patterns across incidents | Whether a near-miss was one bad quarter or something systemic, and whether it clusters around a person, a severity level, or something else | Met vs Exceeded shows how many goals were met and breached across a period. Met vs Exceeded per Criteria breaks the same result down by any field on the work item — Assignee, Severity, Urgency, Source and dozens more — so a pattern doesn't stay hidden inside an aggregate |
| Article 22(d), RTS 2024/1774 — retain evidence securely, for a period commensurate with criticality | A deadline-compliance archive that builds itself, instead of depending on someone remembering to pull a report before an audit | The Report Scheduler emails an .xlsx snapshot to named recipients on a recurring schedule — monthly, on a chosen day and time, in the entity's own timezone. The same data exports on demand as CSV, PDF, JPEG, or SVG |
| Article 5(4)–(5), RTS 2025/301 — the weekend allowance and the entity types it doesn't apply to | Different working calendars for different SLA goals, inside the same Jira space | Each SLA configuration has its own working calendar. On the Advanced plan, calendars can also match the assignee's regional schedule — useful when a compliance team spans time zones |
After the reports go out, the questions change. Instead of "did you meet the deadline," an auditor asks: "show me exactly what happened, who was involved, and whether the same issue keeps coming up." Issue History for Jira is built for that moment — it turns Jira's own change history into an audit trail you can search, filter, and export across every incident this quarter, rather than opening one ticket at a time.
Three requirements sit behind that question, and each asks for something different:
| DORA requirement | What it asks for in practice | The feature that produces it |
|---|---|---|
| Article 17(2) DORA — record all incidents and follow them up so root causes are identified and documented | A record of the incident that survives the incident itself: what was entered, when, by whom, and how it changed as the investigation moved on | Complete work-item history — every field change with old and new value, every status transition, every reassignment, logged as its own event rather than a summary |
| Article 17(3)(c) DORA — assign roles and responsibilities activated for different incident types | Proof that whoever classified the incident, or confirmed the root cause, was authorized to do it | Every change is attributed: who, when, and what changed from what to what — including changes made by automation, such as a Smart Form submission. A change to DORA Classification, Classification Authority, or Root Cause Confirmed is tied to a named actor with a timestamp |
| Article 22, RTS 2024/1774 — mechanisms to analyse significant or recurring incidents and patterns | Reading across a population of incidents, not one ticket at a time | Cross-issue reporting: define the incident population by space, assignee, sprint, label, date range, or other Jira fields, then read the full change history of all of them in one table, with the columns you choose |
| Article 22(d), RTS 2024/1774 — keep evidence available as long as needed, and hand a specific pull to someone outside Jira | Evidence that can be pulled, filtered, and shared without asking the recipient to log into Jira | Export the filtered report to XLSX, CSV, or PDF for your retention schedule, share it by email to named recipients, or as a copyable link |
| Articles 18–19 DORA — showing, after the fact, when the incident was classified as major and when each submission went out | The moment that starts the reporting clock, and evidence each step happened | The moment DORA Classification changed to Major is a logged, timestamped field change. The comment recording that a notification was submitted sits in the same record, in the same export |
A quick note on deletion. Issue History includes a recovery feature for deleted work items — useful if a Risk Task or Reporting Task is removed by mistake. It's worth knowing exactly what "recovery" means: the item returns as a new work item with a new key, starts in To Do, and has its comments restored (marked as restored) but not its original attachments. A separate deleted-items view shows the field values at deletion, which helps spot what happened. Given how recovery works, a more reliable approach for a regulated workflow is to restrict who can delete a Risk Task or Reporting Task.
Time in Status provides workflow intelligence: it shows where work actually waits inside a Jira process, and why. That matters for DORA compliance because Article 17(2) requires procedures to monitor, handle, and follow up on ICT risk. A risk sitting untouched in IN CLARIFICATION for ten hours isn't a paperwork gap — it's a broken process.
If Risk Tasks stall in IN CLARIFICATION, the fix usually isn't to "remind people faster" — it's to check whether the classification criteria let a responder decide quickly. Time in Status won't make that decision for you, but it tells you where to look, which is the first step to fixing the process rather than just tracking the problem.
| What's actually happening | The feature that shows it | Why it matters here |
|---|---|---|
| A stage has no regulatory deadline, but is quietly stalling anyway | Average Time across the treatment statuses (IN CLARIFICATION, MITIGATE and so on), comparable by project, assignee, or issue type | Surfaces the risks being actively worked versus the ones quietly parked — the gap Article 17(2)'s consistent follow-up is meant to close |
| An incident bounces backward instead of moving forward | Status Count shows how many times a work item re-entered a status; Transition Count shows how work actually moved between stages | A risk cycling through IN CLARIFICATION three times is a rework signal pointing at the process — unclear criteria, missing information at intake — not at any one person. The unit of improvement is the workflow, not whoever is assigned |
| A report needs to be readable by someone outside the day-to-day team | Status Groups merge related statuses into one line — the four treatment statuses can read as a single "In treatment" stage — producing clean cycle and lead time figures. The dashboard gadget puts the same numbers in front of leadership for standing oversight | Turns a Jira-native report into something a compliance lead or second-line reviewer can actually read |
| The final report still needs a full timeline | Time in Status per Date and Status Entrance Date give exact durations and entry dates per stage for one incident | A genuine side benefit for Article 19(4)(c) — the timeline falls out of the same data already being used to find and fix bottlenecks |
DORA does not require you to buy new software. It requires you to demonstrate that risk was managed, that deadlines were met, and that evidence is available whenever it is requested. Jira, set up as described here, carries that end-to-end: a workflow for risk, a workflow for reporting, custom fields holding the regulatory decisions, and automation linking the two the moment a risk is classified as Major. The four applications in this article run the same process faster, more automatically, and in a way that is easier to verify.
None of this makes an entity compliant on its own — that remains a decision for your own compliance and legal teams, based on your internal control framework. What these apps do is take the workflow you have already set up in Jira and run more of it for you: fewer statuses moved by hand, fewer deadlines held in someone's head, fewer reports rebuilt from scratch.
When your DORA process still depends on someone remembering what the next step is, that's a sign it should be part of the workflow instead.
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